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Abstract
Given the structure of our Electoral College, there are places in the United States in
which votes simply matter more. Many Americans believe the Electoral College is unfair,
antiquated, and in desperate need of reform. However, alternative electoral proposals designed to
reform our current system may not provide the benefits we seek from an ideal electoral process.
In my thesis, I compare and contrast the current winner-takes-all method of allocating a state’s
electoral votes to one of its most similar and realistic alternatives—the district plan. I compare
the two systems against several criteria that are vital to a well-functioning and healthy
democratic process: legitimacy, inclusiveness, neutrality, simplicity, equality, participation, and
feasibility. Overall, my results demonstrate that while the district plan might offer certain
advantages—for example, increased electoral legitimacy, an expanded campaigning map, and
the possibility for higher rates of voter turnout nationwide—these benefits are neither numerous
nor profound when considering the immense hurdle of passing an electoral reform amendment.
Ultimately, the future of electoral reform rests either on an emphatic embrace of the current
system or an abolishment of the Electoral College and complete restructuring of the electoral
process—no in-between compromise is worth the price.
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Introduction
Voting is one of our most prized privileges in America. Our democratic process forms the
foundation of American pride. Yet, our revered and celebrated system is so painstakingly,
inherently, and obviously unequal. In the months leading up to the 2020 Presidential election, I
moved from New Jersey to Pennsylvania. As a Pennsylvanian, I was bombarded with emails,
texts, mailers, and messages from friends telling me that it was imperative that I voted in this
election. This was quite the contrast from my experience as a New Jerseyan, where the get-outthe-vote measures were practically silent. This stark contrast in my experiences between the two
states was abundantly clear: in one place, I felt my vote mattered; in the other, I did not. I am
motivated to write this thesis because I can’t stop asking myself: does it have to be this way?
Voting is the pinocle of equality in American democracy: every person is allocated one
vote and one vote only. Not only is voting one of the most fervent symbols of equality, but it is
also one of, if not the, most important and most utilized activities of an active citizen. According
to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics,
“casting a ballot is, by far, the most common act of citizenship in democracy because electoral
returns are decisive in determining who shall govern”.1 As Verba et. al explicate, voting is not
only most important, but also the clearest and most direct act to realize institutional change. The
perceptions of how impactful an individual vote can be in this process varies state to state. These
perceptions and experiences cascade into all aspects of our political efficacy, especially
individual motivation to cast a vote all. Therefore, not only does it matter that our vote matters,

Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, et Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American
Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 23.
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but the most effective electoral system should maximize equalizing that power, (that feeling that
“I matter”) for voters across the country.
For centuries, this question of whether our electoral system has to be this way has driven
the call for electoral reform. Today, the majority of Americans believe the Electoral College is
an unfair and antiquated system. At many instances throughout our history, we came close to
effecting sweeping change; however, on the whole, the system has remained largely intact. If
electoral reform has been a consistently popular measure over time, why hasn’t it happened? If
our electoral system has been overwhelmingly dismissed as unfair, confusing, and outdated,
what are we waiting for? If the winner-takes-all system is less than ideal, is the alternative any
better?
A practical approach may offer the best avenue to answer these questions. The possible
options that have been proposed over time—direct election, instant runoff, proportional plan, and
so many more—could span the length of a dissertation, so I have decided to focus on comparing
our current system with its most similar, most realistic alternative: the district plan. The district
plan retains the Electoral College votes as we know it; however, it changes how they are
allocated. Two electoral votes are awarded to the winner of the statewide popular vote and then
the remaining electoral votes are allocated by congressional district—in other words, whoever
wins the popular vote in that district gets the electoral vote.
By utilizing this method of comparison, I hope to unveil some of the advantages and
disadvantages of the Electoral College. While the disadvantages might be clear, the advantages
may be hidden due to the fact that the system is always scrutinized in a vacuum. My plan is to
examine the two electoral systems on a metric of several criteria relevant to a healthy and wellfunction electoral process—legitimacy, inclusiveness, neutrality, simplicity, equality,

7

participation, and feasibility. By analyzing these two systems in multiple ways, I start the
process of revealing whether electoral reform is a dire must or more of a fantasy. Perhaps, the
Electoral College, as is, is the best we can do.
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Literature Review
Introduction
Scholarship on the Electoral College, its effectiveness, and the possibilities for its reform
spans decades, reaching as far back as the ratification of the Constitution itself. In my literature
review, I analyze the findings of prominent scholars surrounding the heated debate and division
over the Electoral College. Reform proposals are the alternative methods to the winner-takes-all
method; the current method, observed by 48 states, allocates all of a state’s electoral votes to that
state’s popular vote winner. I also analyze benefits and drawbacks of the two possibilities for
electoral reform: proposals which would abolish the Electoral College in its entirety and those
which would retain the Electoral College but employ alternative methods for allocating electors
aside from the current winner-takes-all system. Ultimately, I demonstrate that Electoral College
reform, and in essence, the implementation of any electoral system, is a series of tradeoffs
between feasibility of implementation, political equality, and confidence in legitimacy and ease
of recounts.

Federalism as a Cornerstone of the Electoral System
Federalism is the backbone of the Framers’ conception of our electoral process, yet
today, in the debate among scholars and citizens alike, it is both one of the most celebrated
elements and the largest roadblocks to electoral success. Federalism is cemented in the Electoral
College in four distinct ways: 1) appointment of electors by state legislatures, 2) the two electors
representing senatorial seats that each state is allotted, 3) and the process of invoking a house
contingency election which is used when the electoral winner fails to reach a majority of the
9

vote, and 4) states differing in how they structure the elections that select the electors. Robert
Hardaway, a proponent of federalism and of preserving the framers’ intentions of the Electoral
College, details in his book, Saving the Electoral College: Why the national popular vote would
Undermine Democracy, that the crucial role of the two senatorial seats, “reflects the weight that
each state will be given in the presidential elections process.” Hardaway demonstrates that these
two seats are more than simply ceremonial; changes to vote allocation would undermine the
power that states, do and should have in the process. Randall E. Adkins and Kent A. Kirwan, on
the other hand, highlight the nuance of federalism in the fight for a perfect electoral system:
“federalism is often the main target of those who would abolish the Electoral College as well as
the primary feature that prevents ratification of a constitutional amendment to abolish it.” This
quote demonstrates that federalism lies at the heart of this frustrating debate; any attempts to
extract it from the electoral process must be heavily scrutinized.
Hardaway, as well as other lawmakers, demonstrate further not only why federalism
matters but what is its function in the democratic process. Hardaway quotes John F. Kennedy in
his defense of federalism: “direct election would break down the ‘federal system’...[which]
provides a system of checks and balances to ensure that no area or group shall obtain too much
power.”2 Checks and balances, a core tenet established throughout the Constitution, as Kennedy
demonstrates and Hardaway echoes, is just as essential in the electoral process as anywhere else.
Gary E. Bugh, another prominent scholar on electoral reform, expands on the role of federalism
beyond just as an arbiter of checks and balances. He discusses the heated debate that surrounded
the 1970 Senate resistance to direct election stating that the popular vote would eliminate the
very heart of constitutional order, community. More specifically, he cites Senator James Strom

2

Robert M. Hardaway, 1.
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Thurmond (R-SC), who believed that federalism was designed to preserve the inseparable nature
between the individual person and their community.3 According to these scholars and American
leaders, the federalism of the Electoral College is emblematic of America’s core precepts:
preservation of the bond between individual and local community as well as a system of checks
and balances between powerful political factions.

The Framers’ Vision for Electing the President
While the framers’ were empathetic about maintaining federalism throughout the
Constitution, an investigation into their enthusiasm and confidence in the Electoral College
allows scholars today to sincerely question our attachment to an electoral system that its creators
may have, themselves, been misguided in loving.4 George C. Edwards, one of the prominent and
outspoken proponents of abolishing the Electoral College details in his book, Why the Electoral
College is Bad for America, that there was little debate over the Electoral College after it was
ratified. This lack of debate led some framers such as Alexander Hamilton to feel confident in
the plan. However, Edwards points out that this “confidence” could have been a result of
Constitutional Convention fatigue and a desire to avoid further disagreement over constitutional
elements which had been belabored.5 While the framers’ believed federalism in our Electoral
College to be invaluable, revaluating the notion that the Electoral College is the best practical
implementation of that vision is worthwhile.

Gary E. Bugh, “Representation In Congressional Efforts to Amend the Presidential Election System,” in Electoral
College Reform: Challenged and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 15–16.
4
Adkins, “What Role Does the ‘Federalism Bonus’ Play in Presidential Selection?,” 75.
5
George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press
Books, 2019), 102–4.
3
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Edwards illustrates several key factors which were instrumental to the Framers’ choice to
create the Electoral College as we know it today. First, the framers hoped to limit electoral fraud
and believed the Electoral College method promised the “detached existence” of electors. They
believed this structure would prevent the electors, and the overall system, from being susceptible
to bribery. Most notably, however, framers were unconvinced that under a direct election system
the electorate could make informed and reasonable choices. Yet, Edwards notes that many
delegates were in favor of direct election, and despite this support, there was legitimate concern
regarding its implication, particularly how to appropriately control for the population sizes which
greatly differed from state to state. The Electoral College made sense to the framers not only as a
way to prevent bribery and confer legitimacy, but also as a compromise to adhere to the interests
of both large and small states.6
Hardaway provides a vastly different portrayal than Edwards of the framers’ intentions in
creating the Electoral College. According to Hardaway, understanding how the framer’s intended
the Electoral College to function is best done when looking at the Constitution as a whole
document: “such intent is best gleaned by considering the entire Constitution in context”.7 While
Edwards certainly provides more concrete reasons for exactly which intentions drove the
creation of the Electoral College, both historians apply a slightly biased slant in recounting this
origin story, both which further their respective preferences on the Electoral College. Michael T.
Rogers provides yet another interesting voice in the conversation in his article, “A Mere
Deception- A Mere Ignus Fatus on the People of America” in stating that
“most opponents to the popular election at the Convention provide reasons that are not
consistent with the common assumption today that the founders distrusted the common
man and the representative democracy as a mechanism for choosing the chief magistrate.
In actuality, most opposition appears to stem, on the one hand from logistical impracticality
6
7

George C. Edwards III, 104–18.
Robert M. Hardaway, Saving the Electoral College: Why the Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy, 32.
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in a county of the scale of the United States (especially given limited technology and such
a locally oriented people).”8
Rogers’ description sheds light on how practical considerations, especially in detailing
protocol regarding how they would physically implement an election on such a wide scale with
limited technology, plagued the framers to such an extent, and this fact is often lost on
Americans today. Edwards, Hardaway, and Rogers provide three distinct interpretations of the
framers’ intentions—while all valuable—their differences clarify that weight given to any one or
two particular considerations that the framers might have had is not as helpful in evaluating the
Electoral College as it would be to measure it against the current needs of the country.

The Electoral College as a Pro-Slavery Tool
Not only did the Electoral College protect the interests of slaveholders, under this system
college slaveholders had undue power and consequential effect in presidential elections. Because
slaves counted as 3/5 of a person, southern states received an electoral bonus through their slave
population.9 This bonus equated nearly 60% of the slave state population, which served as an
incentive for these states to enslave even more people.10 For example, in 1790, Virginia and
Pennsylvania had the same number of free white men, but Virginia’s additional 300,000 slaves
allotted the state six more House seats and therefore six more electoral votes.11 This
disproportionate power of southern states was known as “Slave Power”, and it impacted the
electoral process as early as the presidential election of 1800. The election was decided by a

Michael T. Rogers, “A Mere Deception- A Mere Ignus Fatus on the People of America,” in Electoral College
Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 18.
9
George C. Edwards III, 104–18.
10
Jesse Wegman, Let the People Pick the President (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2020), 74.
11
Jesse Wegman, 105.
8
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House of Representatives vote, where Thomas Jefferson, the favored candidate in slaveholding
states, won the Electoral College vote 73-65 due to the additional 12-14 votes he received from
“slave-representing” representatives.12 Jefferson would not have beat the incumbent John Adams
without the help of “Slave Power”, revealing some of the most harrowing and detrimental effects
of the Electoral College. The complex relationship between the Electoral College, slavery, and
its role in propagating it, illustrates that this system for electing the president is in fact a relic of
the past and may be unfit to appropriately adhere to the needs of our electorate today.

Direct Election: Electoral Proposals without the Electoral College
The direct election plan, which would establish a winner by the national popular vote and
abolish the Electoral College, is both popular and promising because it prioritizing political
equality above all else.13 Political equality, by definition, gives equal weight to every single
voter’s ballot, and “provides all citizens with a way to engage in civic activity and have a voice
in the governing process”.14 A concept known as, “one person, one vote”.15 Scholars such as
George C. Edwards argue that direct election is the best if not the only option because the
concept of political equality should not only be a significant consideration, it should take
priority, lying at the core of the electoral process.16 Direct election is undeniably the electoral
option which champions political equality the best, and therefore it is unsurprising that,
according to Gallup polling, it consistently polls favorably.17

Jesse Wegman, 105.
Gary E. Bugh, “Representation In Congressional Efforts to Amend the Presidential Election System,” 8.
14
Gary E. Bugh, 8.
15
Gary E. Bugh, 13.
16
George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 39.
17
George C. Edwards III, 40.
12
13
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Electoral College Proposals: Alternative Ways to Allocate Electors
While direct election is perhaps the most well-known, revolutionary, and favored reform
policy, it is only one of the many reforms which has received congressional consideration.
Proposals such as the district plan, proportional plan, and the national popular vote interstate
compact, retain the Electoral College but envision alternative methods for allocating electors as
opposed to the current winner-takes-all system.

District Plan
The district plan involves allocating two electoral votes to the winner of the statewide
popular vote and then allocates remaining electoral votes by congressional district, namely
whoever wins the popular vote in that district gets the electoral vote.18 The district plan has been
debated by Congress since 1800 and throughout the nineteenth century.19Most notably, this plan
stands out to the other reform measures because it has been successfully implemented by two
states: Maine and Nebraska. Another similar proposal to the district plan is the lesser-known
District-Popular plan which is a blend of the district plan and direct election. Under this plan,
every congressional district would receive one vote and instead of the two at-large votes being
allocated to the state-wide winner, they would be allocated to the nationwide popular vote
winner.20

Proportional Plan

Michael J. Korzi, “‘If the Manner of It Be Not Perfect’: Thinking Through Electoral College Reform,” 52–53.
Craig J. Herbst, “Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College with the District-Popular Plan
Note,” Hofstra Law Review 41, no. 1 (2013 2012): 238.
20
Herbst, “Redrawing the Electoral Map,” 239.
18
19
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The proportional plan would require electors and electoral votes to be allocated in each
state according to the percentage of the popular votes won by the candidates in that state.21 One
of the greatest questions surrounding the proportional plan is how to translate non-integer
percentages of candidate popular support to electoral votes. Colorado voted on the proportional
allocation of its’ electors in 2004. While the state voted against the provision, had it been passed
the process for allocating the votes would have involved taking the percentage of the vote each
ticket received, multiplying it by Colorado’s nine electoral votes, and then rounding up or down
this figure to the nearest whole number.22

National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
The National Popular Vote (NPV) interstate compact is an initiative which would achieve
the direct popular election of the president and vice president without a congressional
amendment.23 Any state which agrees to the compact, will immediately award all of its electors
to the winner of the popular vote regardless of who wins the plurality of votes in that state.24 As
of now, 15 states and the District of Columbia have approved of the plan, which encompasses a
total of 196 electoral votes.25 The plan would come into effect once enough states have agreed to
it so that the majority of electoral votes needed to elect the president (270 of the 538) would
automatically be distributed to the winner of the national vote.26

Robert T. Miller, Electoral College: An Analysis (New York, UNITED STATES: Nova Science Publishers,
Incorporated, 2011), 26, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3019540.
22
Miller, 27.
23
Thomas H Neale and Andrew Nolan, “The National Popular Vote (NPV) Initiative: Direct Election of the President
by Interstate Compact,” n.d., 36.
24
Neale and Nolan.
25
Neale and Nolan.
26
George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 210.
21
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Two of the primary factors which contributed to the rise of the national popular vote
initiative were the several decades of unsuccessful efforts to pass a constitutional amendment
that would implement a direct election system the results of the 2000 election. The 2000 election
marked the first time since 1888 elected a candidate to office who won the majority of electoral
votes but did not win the popular vote.27 The 2000 “misfire” contributed to a flurry of research
and scholarship into electoral reform possibilities. Project FairVote, an issue advocacy group,
nonprofit, and nonpartisan organization is known to be the birthplace of the initiative. The plan
has become well known under its manifesto: Every Vote Equal. 28

Direct Election: Benefits
The direct election method, with its absence of electors and therefore lack of
intermediaries between the electorate and the election, is simple, straightforward, and to many
better legitimizes results than the current system.29 Michael J. Korzi highlights that under this
plan there would no longer be any scenarios, like 2000 and 2016, where a “wrong winner” would
be chosen because no longer can there be a gap between the popular vote and the Electoral
College winner.30 Like Korzi, George C. Edwards criticizes the need for intermediaries as well,
yet supporters of the Electoral College deem the electors to be essential for easily translating
popular vote wins into electoral wins, legitimizing the electoral process. Defining legitimacy of
our electoral process, therefore, is at the crux of this debate because pro-direct election scholars

Neale and Nolan, “The National Popular Vote (NPV) Initiative: Direct Election of the President
by Interstate Compact.”
28
Neale and Nolan.
29
George C. Edwards III, 43.
30
Michael J. Korzi, “‘If the Manner of It Be Not Perfect’: Thinking Through Electoral College Reform,” in Electoral
College Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 53.
27
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such as Edwards deem the direct election to be the only sure path to legitimacy because there
could be no discrepancy between who the people want and who is chosen, while Electoral
College loyalists confer legitimacy through large margins in electoral wins. To Edwards and
Korzi, even four elections where the popular vote and electoral winner diverge is too many,
demonstrating the electoral system as we know it, as unreliable.31
The current system biases not only how campaigns make decisions, but whose voices
they prioritize. Amongst first-term administrations, where second elections are on the line,
presidents bias those same places when making presidential visits, allocating funds, and
prioritizing policy implementation.32 The undue power that these places hold is a side-effect of
this system and is why so many demand direct election. Jesse Wegman, in his book, Let the
People Pick the President, discusses how direct election might change the landscape of
campaigning, expanding the electoral map dramatically. Not only would direct election impact
the sheer number of states that candidates would visit, but it would alter how federal funds are
allocated in presidential policymaking. Wegman explicates how presidents have directed the
most funds to swing states where electoral payoff will be greatest. However, under a vastly
different electoral plan such as direct election, “presidents could use discretionary grants and
funds to address the needs of people in states everywhere, including those that currently get
ignored.”33 Direct election provides an equal weight given to all voices, which expands not only
to the elections process but to governing as well.
Through political equality and wide-spread campaign attention thanks to an expanded
electoral map, many believe direct election would necessarily encourage increased political
George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 43.
Brendan J. Doherty, “Electoral College Incentives and Presidential Actions: A Case for Reform?”, in Electoral
College Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 184.
33
Jesse Wegman, Let the People Pick the President (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2020), 250.
31

32
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participation nationwide.34 While this belief is grounded in sound theoretical reasoning, it is often
disputed. While there is no doubt that voter participation is higher in battleground states, there is
some speculation that being in a “safe state” does not necessarily decrease the state’s voter
turnout and discourage anyone from voting, ultimately questioning if there would be same effect
on voter turnout if implemented nationwide.35 In addition to a potential increase in voter turnout,
many speculate that under direct election, the parties would be forced into the middle, where the
political parties would have to employ the most moderate policy position to appeal to the largest
number of voters. For example, Democrats would need to compete for rural votes and
Republicans for Latino voters.36 Direct election provides many benefits: legitimizing the election,
expanding the campaign map, moderating the political parties, and championing political
equality, where every vote can make the same small but consequential impact.

Electoral College Proposals: Benefits
Reasons to consider retaining the Electoral College but reallocating electors highlights
the benefits of the Electoral College while still allowing for its scrutiny and small-scale changes.
the Electoral College has been revered by political scientists as consistently and continually
providing the country with legitimate electoral results. Paul D. Schumacher, unlike Korzi and
Edwards, deems electoral victory as the driving force how presidents acquire legitimacy. Two
factors of the Electoral College provide this legitimacy: 1) the Electoral College converts slim

Jesse Wegman, 252.
Keena Lipsitz, “The Consequences of Battleground and ‘Spectator’ State Residency for Political Participation,”
Political Behavior 31, no. 2 (July 29, 2008): 187, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-008-9068-7.
36
Jesse Wegman, Let the People Pick the President, 256.
34
35
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popular vote margins into decisive victories, 2) it reduces the extensiveness of recount activities
that a national vote could require.37
Aside from legitimacy and accessibility and ease of necessary recounts, another benefit
of the Electoral College is that it reinforces the two-party system and thwarts the possibility of
third-party candidates unexpectedly taking the presidency. Voters are encouraged not to waste
their votes on unelectable candidates under this system.38 According to Alexandra Kura in her
book Electoral College and the Presidential Elections, the “winner-take-all method” to the
creation and endurance of the two-party system and has encouraged coalition building which
have created “inclusive” political parties. Kura highlights advantages of this system by stating
that the “American parties have historically shown the ability to maintain broad appeal by
incorporating new principles and policies in their platforms.”39 Yet, strengthening the two-party
system is not always celebrated by scholars. Schumacher, for example, disagrees that an electoral
system should aim to strengthen the two-party system. He finds that the Electoral College is
flawed because it undermines sincere voting since voters must choose the most electable
candidate instead of the candidate which best represents their interests.40
Additionally, Robert Hardaway highlights the messiness that electoral reform plans
would bring to campaigning, especially under direct election. 41 Many other authors exclude the
discussion of campaigning as one of the many benefits of the Electoral College today because of
the widespread dissatisfaction with how it currently operates. The Electoral College under

Paul D. Schumacher, “‘The Good, the Better, the Best: Improving on the “Acceptable” Electoral College,’” in
Electoral College Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 213.
38
Paul D. Schumacher, 209.
39
Alexandra Kura, Electoral College and Presidential Elections (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.,
2001), 52–53.
40
Paul D. Schumacher, 209.
41
Robert M. Hardaway, Saving the Electoral College: Why the Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy, 67.
37
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winner-takes-all allows for a relative ease and structure to large-scale national campaigning since
candidates can easily pinpoint key areas of interest, however “ease” and “structure”, to many
scholars, should not be the goal of campaigns. Legitimacy, ease of recount, and endurance of the
two-party system are revered as essential elements to the electoral process that the Electoral
College upholds.

District Plan
Currently adopted by two states, the district plan acts as middle ground between direct
election and winner-takes-all; it upholds the power of small states, making it feasible for
implementation and retaining federalism, but is more equitable than the current system,
expanding electoral influence on smaller but more numerous districts nationwide.42 Winning
small-state approval for electoral reform can be nearly impossible, however, in Mark J.
McKenzie’s analysis of systemic biases which affect congressional voting on Electoral College
reform, he reveals the immense popularity of the district system amongst the Plains and Southern
states during the 1960 House vote. Small states were pro-district plan, as opposed to large-state
representatives who opposed plan because it weakened their influence by breaking up the
electoral votes.43 Consistent with the preservation of small state power, the district plan is the
reform option which is most consistent with the original aim of the framers’ vision for
federalism; it places value on community and a system of checks and balances.44 Additionally,
advocates for the district popular plan as well as the district plan praise its ability to disperse and
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widen the competitive places on the electoral map, expand campaigning, and encourage voter
turnout.45 As the goldilocks of electoral reform plans, the district method presents mild
advantages but has higher probability for successful reform.

Proportional Plan
Proponents of the proportional plan consider it to be the fairest of all measures because it
most accurately reflects the preferences of voters. The plan similarly provides recognition and
substantial electoral allocation for third party candidates.46 Many versions of the proportional
plan eliminate the need for human electors which would eliminate the concern of faithless
electors.47 In Henry Cabot Lodge’s Senate promotion of the proportional plan in 1950, he stated
stating that it would preserve and protect the rights of small states.48 However, further analysis of
the reality of implementing this plan demonstrates that small states have little to gain from this
plan, since dividing up an already small number of electoral votes has marginal benefits, whereas
large state could see instrumental changes under this system.49

National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
The National Popular Vote initiative plan side-steps what has seen to be the greatest
obstacle to Electoral College reform—passing a constitutional amendment.50 The initiative is
advantageous because it addresses main objections to the Electoral College. First, the plan
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champions political equality, counting all votes equally. Second, there would no longer be a
“wrong” winner chosen in an election due to a gap between the Electoral College winner and the
national popular vote winner.51 The plan has attracted considerable support, has been
accompanied by powerful scholarship, and incorporates support from the public in that the
majority of Americans want to see Electoral College reform which includes the direct election of
the president.52 As recently as the 2020 election, Colorado voted to stay in the compact. The state
joined the compact last year, yet a repeal effort ended up on the ballot during the most recent
election.53 Colorado’s voter-driven approval of the plan could indicate the rise of support from
“swing-like” states, a significant differentiation from the entirely democratic slate of states that
have previously joined the compact, giving the compact hope for a future with bipartisan
support.

Direct Election: Drawbacks
While some scholars view direct election to be the best way to reflect the true interests of
the nation, others view it as a disaster for electoral legitimacy and election security. One of the
reasons for the lack of confidence in the direct election plan is that there is uncertainty to
whether a plurality or a majority is necessary for deciding a winner.54 If the outcome of the
national popular vote is extremely close, doubts about the legitimacy of the election could ensue,
especially if the winner did not receive a majority of the votes. However, to combat these
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concerns, reform plans have proposed instant runoff between two top finishing candidates under
these circumstances.55 Another one of the major issues with the plan, is the is the chaotic nature
of recounts if needed.56 Scholarship presented in this literature review on the direct election plan
predated the chaotic aftermath of the 2020 election, in which false allegations of election fraud
ran rampant. Due to the unprecedented and abrupt shift in the political climate on election
certainty, new light is shed on the importance of election legitimacy and ease of widespread
recounts in any reform measure, which previous scholarship may not have emphasized. Most
notably, direct election, the most drastic change to the electoral process, poses concerns
regarding how feasible it would be to implement an amendment for it. Congress would be
challenged to achieve small state approval of the plan because it effectively strips small states of
their power in the Electoral College.

Electoral College Proposals: Drawbacks
The Electoral College, currently praised for providing the most legitimate and secure
electoral results, harbors “hidden landmines”, while rare, could greatly hinder its effects of
legitimacy. Those landmines are: 1) invoking of a House contingency election as well as 2) the
possibility of faithless electors.57 Jesse Wegman, like Korzi and Edwards, discusses how the
Electoral College can have the opposite effect—a lack of legitimacy—when either the popular
vote winner and the Electoral College winner are different or one of the landmines listed above
comes into effect.58 Robert Hardaway agrees with the Electoral College’s ability to ensure
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legitimacy. He reminds critics of the Electoral College that a direct election system could involve
nightmarish recounts in every state and every precinct in the country if the results were
disputable or too close to call.59 Wegman, on the other hand, recalls how America’s faith is
shaken when the Electoral College winner and national winner do not align (which has been
particularly salient in the last decade). In response to this claim, Hardaway draws attention to the
200 plus years in which the Electoral College has provided the country with reputable, reliable,
and indistinguishable results that have laid the groundwork for peaceful transition of power.60
Legitimacy is the one of the greatest advantages of the Electoral College. However, rare, but
possible, scenarios of a House contingency elections, faithless electors, or popular vote mismatch
would not simply shake faith in the system, it could nearly destroy it.

District Plan
The district plan, while theoretically advantageous, brings to light concerns regarding
how effective it would be at increasing competitive areas and political equality. While the plan
appears to democratize the electoral process even further by expanding the reach of campaigns to
“swing districts” as opposed to “swing states” the amount of House districts which are
competitive in the House election is a disappointing reality. The non-competitiveness of 90% of
House races does not bode well for potential competitiveness in a national district plan,
subsequent campaign attention that districts would receive, and increasing voter turnout.61
However, this analysis of the system assumes that individuals would treat House elections the
same as presidential elections. Robert C. Turner, for example, addresses the main concerns of the
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district plan in his analysis, “The Contemporary Presidency: Do Nebraska and Maine have the
Right Idea? The Political and Partisan Implications of the District System” by analyzing the 2000
Presidential results from the district perspective. His findings demonstrate the district system
would create a broader electoral coalition than the system as is, and it would increase the
competitiveness of the congressional elections.
With a transition from swing states to swing districts under this plan, new demographic
concerns are brought to light. Turner finds that the district system has a strong demographic and
partisan bias, wherein the plan disenfranchises minorities groups further and give
disproportionate electoral advantages to Republican candidates.62 Turner highlights these
concerns; however, his scope is limited to 1992-2000 congressional districts. While further
investigation of Turner’s allegations is imminent, the increased competitiveness and relevance of
districts alone make them subject to corruption and partisan interference. As recent as January
2021, Wisconsin has proposed a plan to implement the district plan, which has come under
heavy criticism because of the implications for gerrymandering in the state if implemented. One
elections researcher, Barry Burden, remarks that that gerrymandering is, “already an ugly
process but it will be on steroids if those districts affect not only the control of Congress but also
control of the presidency”.63 These allegations against the district plan are not to be taken lightly;
the district plan appears to champion compromise while in actuality has the potential to do some
real damage to the democratic process.
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Proportional Plan
The proportional plan is complex—probably the most of all the reform plans—and
scholars have referenced its complexity as the greatest reason to avoid this reform. George C.
Edwards raises concerns that it could never achieve a constitutional amendment, making it
highly unfeasible, while other critics warn of electoral deadlocks.64 The proportional plan would
not have prevented electoral deadlock in 1960, 1968, 1992, 1996, and 2000. Elections in 1968,
1992, and 1996 would have been contentious mostly due to third party candidates in the race.
Thomas Neale in his article, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Elections,
echoes this point, arguing that the proportional plan would only lead to an increasing number of
deadlocked elections.65 George C. Edwards warns that the proportional plan would have caused
Mitt Romney to win in the 2012 election, prompting questions of the massive alterations the plan
would have on electoral victories. While many praise Electoral College reform plans which
encourage third parties, Edwards warns of the proportional plan’s tendency to elevate third party
candidates and the “mischief that third parties can cause in contingent elections”.66 Michael
Korzi warns that if third party candidates take even 10 electoral votes away from major party
candidates, the election could be sent to the House of Representatives—a harrowing thought for
the legitimacy and stability of our electoral system and presidential victories.67 The rise in
relevance of third parties which some Electoral College reform plans encourage, has been hotly
debated amongst scholars as to whether it is an advantage or a disadvantage to the electoral
process.

George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 208.
Thomas H. Neale, “The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections,” in The Electoral
College: An Analysis (Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2011), 72.
66
George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 209.
67
Michael J. Korzi, “‘If the Manner of It Be Not Perfect’: Thinking Through Electoral College Reform,” 57.
64
65

27

Yet, the greatest issue of complexity lies in the plan’s implementation. While the 2004
proportional plan proposal in Colorado had detailed plans for the how the state would handle
issues of rounding, implementing the proportional plan nationally would necessarily lead to great
controversy with determining issues of rounding. If rounding policy vastly different state to state,
we could only imagine that our already complex electoral system would become even more
complex and difficult to understand.68 Ultimately, simplicity in an electoral system is an
increasingly relevant factor in constructing it, because greater internal political efficacy—or the
self-perception that an individual is capable of understanding politics—provides more citizens
with the competence and thus the confidence to participate in political acts such as (and most
importantly to an electoral system) voting. 69
A major gap in the literature on the proportional plan whether the plan holds a
demographic bias. When Henry Cabot Lodge brought the plan to the Senate in 1950, he framed
the invention of the plan as fighting “Pivotal State Evil” which he felt dominated the electoral
map. He described this evil as the major parties giving “undue attention to the demands and
programs of relatively unimportant groups or factions”.70 Ultimately, proportional supporters
found it troubling that parties were concentrating their efforts on policy that would benefit
minorities in urban areas also known as “the unimportant groups or factions” that Lodge refers
to.71 While Lodge brought the proportional plan to the Senate floor with hopes of thwarting the
interests of minorities in urban areas, the plan’s implementation raises questions of how it would
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impact minority voters today, and if there would be an increased benefit or further
disenfranchisement compared to the current system.

National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, while appealing because it sidesteps the
hurdle of a constitutional amendment, raises questions of legality, simplicity, and legitimacy.
Primarily, the legality of the compact is the often the first point of disapproval from many
scholars. Article 1, section 10 of the constitution prohibits states from entering into any
“agreement or Compact with another state” without the consent of Congress, and it has been
unclear whether this agreement falls under that precise distinction.72 The Supreme Court has
drawn distinctions between compacts dealing with a variety of different concerns and many
proponents of the NPV initiative argue that based on those precedents congressional approval is
not necessary for this plan.73 Additionally, the plan might complicate how voters come to
understand election results. A voter’s state may have an apparent winner, yet the state’s electoral
votes will automatically be attributed to another candidate, easily creating more confusion and
complexity amongst voters. Additionally, federalism is largely removed from the electoral
system under this plan; while electors exist, they become irrelevant and purely ceremonial.74
Critics of the plan say that it is chaotic; relying on a national popular vote tabulation with
strict accuracy, and reliability of recounting would be fraught with challenges and missteps.75
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Scholars are concerned about the limitations of statutes regarding the plan. Whereas an
amendment to the constitution would be “set in stone” to a large extent, predicating the entire
electoral system on a statute is far less reliable and durable over time.76 The plan attracts plentiful
criticisms in addition to the ones listed above, yet one that is often forgotten and played down is
the issue of faithless electors with the initiative because there is no national popular vote
proposal or laws forbidding faithless electors.77 However, in July of 2020 the Supreme Court
ruled that states have clear power to require their presidential electors to vote for their party’s
candidate, eliminating some of the major concerns with faithless electors in any electoral system
which retains the Electoral College, but particularly with the initiative. 78
Yet, the greatest concern with the plan is its feasibility, particularly because the plan is
far from gaining bipartisan approval. The compact has been widely criticized by Republicans in
recent years for having a clear bias towards Democratic candidates. However, according to Jesse
Wegman in his book, Let the People Pick the President, that has not always been the case. John
Koza, the author of the plan, was concerned that because the initial handful of states which
passed the initiative were Democratic the plan would look to Republicans as if it was a partisan
ploy to steal the White House, despite the fact that he has always viewed the plan as a bipartisan
way to elect the president.79 After the 2012 Obama reelection, Republican lawmakers grew more
open to the idea, however the 2016 election—almost instantly—prompted conservative support
for the initiative to vanish.80 The vastly partisan misconceptions regarding the plan have resulted
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in fruitless results over the years, and demonstrates how bipartisan support for any electoral
reform plan is instrumental to enacting any kind of progress towards a better electoral system.

The Problem of Faithless Electors
The issue of faithless electors is often forgotten because it rarely occurs, yet not only is it
a concern that plagues all of the reform plans which retain the Electoral College and human
electors, it can have drastic implications on outcomes of elections and our confidence in them.
The founding fathers created this mechanism to protect the American people from the dangers of
a demagogue, since they could act freely against election results if they believed the people had
chosen an unfit leader.81 Alexander Hamilton, believed that with electors “no corruption” could
be possible with this system because of their “detached experience” from the larger electorate.82
However, as Jesse Wegman explicates in his book, there has not be a single body of electors
since 1792 which have been, “independent, deliberative actors who saw their task as picking the
fittest person for the job”.83 In fact, each presidential candidate has his or her own pre-picked
slate of electors. These electors are sworn to partisan loyalty and are sent to the state capital on
the day the Electoral College votes in order to cast votes for their party’s candidate if that party
wins the state popular vote.84
Furthermore, many states have laws punishing electors if they decide to stray away from
the state’s popular vote winner, and as detailed above, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
states have this right in the July 2020 ruling.85 All congressional reform plans—such as the
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automatic plan—which would eliminate the need for human electors and automatically require
every state to utilize the “winner takes all” method failed to receive congressional approval.
Therefore, not only do electors not necessarily uphold the partisan and unbiased vision of the
framers, they remain living, breathing, autonomous actors which can, in those states which do
not have laws against it, vote for the candidate that they believe would best represent the
interests of the nation.86
In 2016, a handful of electors felt that it was their patriotic duty to do just that. Michael
Baca, a member of the Electoral College from Colorado, realized that it would only take 37
rogue Republican electors to prevent Donald Trump from winning and ultimately throw the
election to the House of Representatives, which had not happened since 1825. Baca tried to
organize a coalition of faithless electors through an organization he called the Hamilton Electors.
On Electoral College day, only 10 electors ended up breaking their pledges and many of those,
including Baca’s, had been invalidated by the state and required a different elector to step in and
recast the vote.87 Ultimately, the plan of the Hamilton Electors did not succeed but it did remind
the American public that the freedom of electors can have some potentially drastic consequences,
especially in elections where the electoral win is very thin.
Despite Alexander Hamilton’s vision of a “detached experience” of electors, scholarship
demonstrates that electors are often subject to powerful attempts at persuasion and lobbying.
Robert M. Alexander, in his article, Lobbying the Electoral College: The Potential for Chaos,
analyzed the incidence of faithless electors in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. He
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explicitly analyzed the effects of lobbying campaigns on those electors to change their votes.88
The 2000 election was fraught with lobbying efforts, as one might assume given the
contentiousness of the election outcome. Electors were bombarded with emails, telephone calls,
even grassroots campaigns, the most notable being Citizens for True Democracy. These
campaigns mobilized to encourage Republican electors to vote against their party.89 Alexander
surveyed the electors by sending all 538 members of both election’s Electoral College members
mail-in surveys.90 Alexander’s findings demonstrate that large numbers of presidential electors
were lobbied to change their votes, and many of the electors gave significant consideration to
defecting, however none of them actually did.91
Supporters of the Electoral College often remind critics that the issue of faithless electors
can be a problem in whatever electoral plan retains their autonomy, most notably the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact.92 The issue of faithless electors, therefore, should be more
relevant in the conversations that scholars and politicians are having about the Electoral College
today. While faithless electors have never implemented any consequential changes on election
outcomes—there only being 165 incidences of faithless in the history of the Electoral College to
date—the ease of even one faithless elector in disenfranchising thousands upon thousands of
voters and create large uncertainty and illegitimacy of the election results in the eyes of the
American public cannot be understated.93
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An Alternative Election Procedure: Ranked Choice Voting
Electoral reform is not limited to alterations to electoral vote alone, in fact, many reform
measures propose innovative methods to how citizens vote for candidates; one of the most
notable proposals is the Ranked Choice Voting method. Ranked Choice Voting was first
implemented in a state in Maine in 2018, following the lead of several US cities.94 Ranked
Choice Voting (RCV), also known as instant runoff voting, is the electoral procedure in which
voters rank their candidate preferences, and if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first
round then the lowest recipients of votes is eliminated. Then, second preferences on the ballots
of eliminated candidates are reallocated to the surviving candidates until there is a majority
achieved for a single candidate.95 Ultimately, rank choice voting asks voters, if not your preferred
candidate, who would be the most reasonable second, third, and so on alternatives?96
Proponents of Rank Choice Voting say that this method expands the amount of people
whose votes “matter” or have consequential effect, increases competition, and allows for more
diverse and minority candidates to run without feeling as if they would “threaten” or “take votes
away from” a major party candidate.97 Australia is one of several countries which has
implemented this system (amongst Ireland, Malta, New Zealand, Scotland, and more) and often
sees upwards of six candidates run in house elections and there is rarely talk of any of these
minor candidates “spoiling” the election.98 Rank Choice Voting similarly, increases sincere
voting in the sense that the system encourages rather than discourages voters to rank third party

Rob Richie, “National Implications of Maine Adoption of Ranked Choice Voting,” National Civic Review 106, no. 1
(2017): 22, https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.21312.
95
Richard Nunan, “As Maine Goes, So Goes the Nation? Ranked Choice Voting and STV as Antidotes to Tribal
Populism,” in Democracy, Populism, and Truth (Springer International Publishing AG, 2020), 147.
96
Richard Nunan, 147.
97
Richie, “National Implications of Maine Adoption of Ranked Choice Voting,” 20.
98
Richie, “National Implications of Maine Adoption of Ranked Choice Voting” 21.
94

34

candidates as a first choice.99 Scholars deem Rank Choice Voting as a more neutral system than
the current way of voting in the sense that it does not bias campaigns and candidates to adhere to
the interests of key battleground states or even battleground districts.100
Additionally, scholars such as Paul D. Schumacher state that Rank Choice Voting
increases voter participation because voters who are currently disaffected with the major party
candidates would still feel motivated to vote since they will not be perturbed to cast a ballot for
their preferred third party candidate.101 Rob Richie in his article, “National Implications of Maine
Adoption of Ranked Choice Voting”, discusses how voter turnout has risen sharply in decisive
mayoral elections in cities which have adopted this system—as compared to previous systems
which have primaries and runoffs.102 Another common praise of the system is that it would
diminish the probability of an extreme candidate taking office because it assumes that moderate
voters would necessarily choose other moderate candidates as their second and third choices.103
Ranked choice voting could reasonably avoid issues pertaining to legitimacy, since the
winner will always receive a majority of votes. This method is also deemed “more legitimate”
because the possibility of rogue voters and a House contingency election would most likely be
avoided.104 Yet, it is important to envision that implementing this system would be faced with
some resistance from Americans who are not used to crafting their electoral choices with
multiple candidates in mind. Rank Choice Voting could therefore add some complexity to our
current system, which many electoral reform plans (as stated in the previous section) have hoped
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to eliminate.105 Similarly, without the ease of voting simply along party lines only, the bar is
significantly raised for how a voter can make an informed vote with so many more options to
consider under this plan.106
Ranked Choice Voting appears to have many benefits, but some recent studies show that
the benefits do not necessarily translate to results when implemented. One analysis of survey
respondents on RCV, conducted by Lindsay Nielson in 2017, demonstrated that voters who have
participated in RCV elections were no more likely to think that these kinds of elections produced
fairer outcomes.107 Another study conducted by McDaniel demonstrated that in mayoral elections
in Oakland and San Francisco California that racially polarized voting did not decrease due to
Ranked Choice Voting and voters still used their vote to express racial interests, despite the fact
that Ranked Choice Voting has been said to increase moderation in elections and decrease
extremism or polarization.108 The studies act as important reminders that there might be large
gaps between theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence about Ranked Choice Voting and
its implications for expanding equality in our electoral system.

Possibilities of a Congressional Amendment for Reform
There have been more than 700 proposals to change the Electoral College over the past
200 years, making the Electoral College the part of the constitution with the most proposals in
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history.109 Despite numerous reform proposals spanning decades, the Electoral College has seen
very little structural change. In fact, there have only been a handful of times where there have
been some slight procedural changes to how the president is elected (such as in 1887, for
example). The only monumental constitutional shift occurred in 1804 when Congress ratified the
Twelfth Amendment.110 The Twelfth Amendment distinguished elector ballots between president
and vice president and solidified the role that political parties would play in the electing the
president.111
Gary Bugh, in his article, The Challenges of Contemporary Electoral College Reform,
parses through the decades of reform efforts in Congress and aggregates the data to illustrate the
most prosperous time-periods for reform. His findings demonstrate that reform proposals were
low between 1911 and 1960 with only 173 proposals, particularly high between 1961 and 1980
with 433 proposals, and dropping again between 1981 and 2010 with 76 proposals.112 Proposals
during the latest period only represent 11 percent of the 682 Electoral College proposals since
1911.113 Most notable about this surprising statistic is that Electoral College reform activity in
Congress did not change or improve at all after the contentious 2000 election.114
Bugh’s research demonstrates that the 91st Congress, the Congress between 1969 and
1970, saw the greatest number of proposals in any single year: 106.115 Scholars such as James P.
Melcher in his article, Exploring Difficulties of Electoral College Reform at the State Level:
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Maine and Nebraska Lead the Way, attempt to make sense of this unique year for Congress.116
The preceding election, the presidential election of 1968, “did a great deal to shake up the way
that elections work in the United States”.117 For example, changes in party nomination and
campaign strategy followed the election. Most notably, however, an Independent party
candidate, George Wallace, ended up with 46 electoral votes, and coupled with other
surrounding political events of 1968, Americans faith in the Electoral College was reasonably
shaken.118 Democratic Senator Birch Evan Bayh from Indiana and Representative Emanual
Celler from New York spearheaded the efforts to pass direct election in 1968 under the principle
of “one person, one vote” or political equality. The plan passed in the House 338-70. While
many had high expectations of passing the plan in the Senate after a resounding win in the
House, Republican Senator Karl Earl Mundt from South Dakota led a minority filibuster which
stopped the Bayh plan from seeing the Senate floor, and thus electoral reform was blocked
again.119
While the 1969 reform proposals saw what may be considered the closest Congress has
ever come to passing electoral reform, and direct election specifically, the proposal did in fact
fail which begs the question if implementing constitutional change for electoral reform is ever
possible. This question has bothered electoral reformers and is a primary reason for the national
popular vote interstate compact, because it can achieve the goal of reform without the
mountainous hurdle of an amendment. However, some scholars, such as Burdett Loomis in his
article, Pipe Dream or Possibility? Amending the U.S. Constitution to achieve Electoral Reform,
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express that hope remains for an amendment. Loomis looks at the 1969 reform proposal as
Congress coming within “shouting distance” of scrapping the Electoral College and
demonstrates that popular support will always be for a direct election system because most
Americans do not like nor understand the Electoral College.120 However, Gary Bugh discusses
that electoral reform has consistently been backed by Democrats from 1911 to 2010. However,
before 1980, there was significant bipartisan support for reform, that has precipitously decreased
since. 121 A constitutional amendment might be in the realm of possibility, but until Electoral
College reform is presented in a bipartisan fashion once again, prospects for passing an
amendment remain dim.

Conclusion
Electoral College reform is a lofty goal, but it remains in the realm of possibility. Reform
measures which retain the framer’s vision of federalism, do not usurp the rights of small states in
their entirety, and do not have clear partisan advantage are ripe for the possibility of ratification.
A constitutional amendment which abolishes the Electoral College altogether and replaces it with
direct election is impossible without bipartisan appeal, and at the moment, bipartisan support is
unlikely. In the remainder of this thesis, the focus will be on feasible reform measures—those
which reimagine elector allocation within the current Electoral College structure. The district
plan, the most feasible reform option, is most worthy of in-depth review and consideration.
Under this plan, federalism is retained, small states hold on to their power, all while the electoral
map is expanded and participation rates increase—according to the literature. My analysis will
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comb through these claims, evaluating if the plan delivers on its promises, pleasing both
Electoral College supporters and reformers enough to justify altering our two-hundred-year-old
system.
While electoral measures that retain the structure of electors—such as the district plan—
might be advantageous because they are feasible, they are not necessarily ideal. This literature
review highlights the desperate cry amongst both political elites and the American public for
fundamental electoral change which prioritizes political equality, one which expands the quantity
of votes which “matter” beyond simply those of swing and small states. While a perfectly
politically equal electorate is the ideal of electoral reform, concerns—those which have gained
unavoidable attention at the tail end of the Trump era—such as recount havoc, election
legitimacy, and campaigning strategies have reminded us why it is not entirely achievable.
Therefore, perfect reform should not be the focus; compromise should take center-stage: reform
must attempt to expand electorate power to the currently disenfranchised, but also be strategic in
adhering to legitimacy and bipartisan appeal. The Constitution is the document of compromises
and the electoral process is no exception.
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The District Plan: Case Study Analysis
The district plan appears to champion compromise: acting as a middle ground between
federalism, political equality, and realistic electoral implementation. Maine and Nebraska, the
two states which have already adopted the plan not only have years of data generated on the
success of the plans but can act as studies and exemplars for any future implementation of the
plan. Maine adopted the plan in 1969 and Nebraska in 1991.122Aside from these two states,
Michigan briefly adopted the district plan for one election in 1892, but it was simply a one
election experiment.123 I will briefly analyze the historical context that surrounded the decision
for both Maine and Nebraska to ratify this plan and if the states have seen advantageous,
problematic, or ambivalent results as a consequence.

Maine
The time around which Maine ratified the district plan could be described as a “perfect
storm” of circumstances to breed Electoral College reform. Maine ratified electoral reform in
1969, to first be implemented in 1972. As discussed in the literature review, 1969 was the year
which saw the most electoral reform proposals, 106. Many attribute this spike in proposals to the
tumultuous 1968 election, where a third-party candidate, George Wallace, snagged a total of 46
electoral votes.124 Thanks to the 1968 election and the general political upheaval and agitation
towards progressive reform, 1969 was arguably the closest Congress has ever been to ratifying a
plan which would abolish the Electoral College and replace it with direct election. While the plan
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did not pass, the congressional events leading up to the plan were particularly salient for the
people of Maine for two reasons. First, Mainers were significantly engaged in the 1968 election
because the first Mainer since 1884, Senator Ed Muskie, was on a major party ticket.125
Secondly, Maine representatives had been particularly engaged in Electoral College reform
throughout the preceding decade. Most notably, Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith (the
first woman elected to serve in both the Senate and the House of Representatives) was an
instrumental figure in leading electoral reform in Washington.126 Senator Smith proposed the
Smith Plan in SJ Res. 1 which would abolish the Electoral College replacing it with direct
election, institute a runoff procedure if no candidate received a majority, and implement a
national primary system to nominate the President and Vice President.127 While Smith’s plan did
not pass, it demonstrates that Maine had been exposed to conversations regarding Electoral
College reform long before the rest of the nation.
In 1969, Democratic state Representative Glenn Starbird introduced a bill which would
divide Maine into four separate districts and devote one of Maine’s four existing electoral votes
to each of the districts. This plan was replaced only six weeks later by Republican Representative
Raymond Rideout’s plan, the plan we know of today, which would allocate two electoral votes
to the popular vote winners in each district, and two votes to the popular vote winner
statewide.128 James Melcher states in his analysis of this historic period when Maine ratified the
district plan, Exploring the Difficulties of Electoral College Reform at the State Level, that there
were four instrumental elements which explain why Maine was able to pass such revolutionary
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electoral reform: 1) prominent Maine political leaders, like Margaret Chase Smith, advocated for
national electoral reform in Washington making it a salient issue for Mainers, 2) the 1968
election sparked nationwide skepticism for the Electoral College and emphasized calls for
reform, 3) “policy entrepreneurs” such as Glenn Starbird and Raymond Rideout were making
substantial changes in the state not only with respect to the Electoral College but on other issues
as well, 4) and finally the support for electoral reform was bipartisan in nature, which has been
one of, if not, the most crucial indicators of success for electoral reform proposals throughout
American history.129
Despite the revolutionary nature of Maine’s electoral shift from “winner-takes-all” to the
district plan, 2016 and 2020 are the only two election in which the state’s two congressional
districts voted differently.130 Despite a lack of concrete electoral changes, the district plan had
several effects on the political experience of Mainers. According to the Maine.gov website,
Maine has consistently been one of the states with the highest voter turnout rates in national
elections.131 In a recent article entitled, “As Maine goes, so goes Electoral College reform,
maybe”, the incumbent Democratic Representative Jared Golden of Maine is quoted stating:
“There’s a lot of split tickets here…We take out own path in thought and personal lifestyle here.
Voters here aren’t committed to individuals or parties but look at every election separately.”132
Maine’s culture surrounding elections may have been shaped by the distinctiveness of its
electoral system against the background of the national preference for winner-takes-all,
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emboldening its citizens with higher levels of political efficacy, the feeling that their vote in
elections can and will make a difference.

Nebraska
Nebraska ratified electoral reform in 1991. Unlike Maine, this change was not as a
response to a national push toward progressive reform on electoral policy, as was the case in
1969. In fact, Nebraska felt neglected by candidates and campaigns for years because of its
unchanging Republican voting history. Therefore, its legislature believed that altering the system
to a district system would bring national attention and numerous campaign visits. From 1968 to
1988, the Republican candidate won election in Nebraska six times and did so with a resounding
margin of an average of over thirty points. 133 Democratic representative DiAnna Schimek
bolstered support for the district plan by reminding Republican legislators of a time when
“Nebraska mattered” which was during Bobby Kennedy’s 11-city tour of the state in 1968 in
order to win the state’s Democratic primary.134 Ultimately, when it came to ratifying the new
electoral reform in Nebraska in the early nineties, James Melcher explains that, with very few
truly competitive areas of the state, the state had “little to lose by trying the district system”. 135
However, Nebraska was fairly disappointed by the 1992 campaign trail results,
demonstrating that the plan’s hope to bring more political and campaign attention to the state had
not quite met its expectations. State Senator Doug Kristensen, a then vocal opponent of the
district plan, stated after the 1992 election: “I am not sure the presidential candidates flew over
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Nebraska, much less stopped.”136 After the 2000 election, the secretary of state for elections
raised concerns with the district plan’s goals stating, “we didn’t get a presidential candidate this
year or a vice presidential candidate. We didn’t even get the presidential candidate’s wives. We
got the vice president’s wife.”137
Ultimately, the plan did not provide any “success” or any electoral changes until 2008,
when Nebraska first split its electoral votes. Nebraska’s second congressional district gave one
electoral vote to Barack Obama. This was not a coincidence, in fact, Obama’s campaign sent
thousands of field workers to the district, which is where Omaha is located, winning the district
by approximately 3,000 votes.138 In a 2016 speech in Omaha, after which Obama did not win any
of the districts in Nebraska during the 2012 election, he affectionately recalled how supporters
renamed Omaha to “Obamaha” because of the unprecedented feat of splitting the electoral votes
in 2008.139 Obama’s victory in Nebraska’s second congressional district demonstrates that
possibly Nebraska lawmakers were on to something when implementing the district plan.
Perhaps, greater campaign attention would yield competitive results even in the vastly
Republican state.
Nebraska once again split its votes in the 2020 election, where Joe Biden won Nebraska’s
second district as well. One of the state’s Republican electors, Steve Nelson, commented on the
win saying that “it reflects both the level of interest in the 2020 election as well as the growing
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political power of Omaha”.140 Nebraska’s unique use of the district plan might very well be the
driving force behind why Omaha has gained this growing political power, because without the
plan, Omaha would wash away into irrelevance against the backdrop of the overwhelmingly red
state. In November 2020, during the tumultuous few days between election day and the 2020
race being called, the New York Times, among other publications, published an article entitled,
“Could Omaha Swing the Race? In 2020, Nothing is Impossible”, indicating how consequential
the singular electoral vote could be in one likely scenario of Electoral College paths to victory
for Joe Biden.141 While Nebraskan lawmakers might have been disillusioned by the district plan
in the several elections between 1992 and 2008 where there was no evidence that it was making
any substantial changes, the 2008 and 2020 elections indicate that the plan might not be a waste
and has a lot of untapped potential.
Despite the 2008 excitement surrounding Nebraska’s implementation of the district plan,
Republican lawmakers have been consistently pushing against the plan since it was enacted. In
2008, before the election, Republican Party Chair Mark Quandahl believed that Nebraska was
“out of step” with the rest of the nation and stated that “sometimes when a state does something
in a different manner, people call it unique, which is a polite way of saying it is weird.”142 He
insisted that the state scrap that plan and return to the “winner-takes-all” method like everyone
else.143 The argument that Nebraska is somehow out of line with the rest of the nation in
implementing this plan has become particularly salient to the state’s Republicans. In 2016,
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Republican Senator Robert Hilkemann stated, “Why would we want to be different than all other
48 states?” he continues, “for me it was more the principle of the thing”.144
Democratic leaders are pushing back on this Republican conformist rhetoric, especially
beloved Senator Ernie Chambers, who has made it his mission while in office to fight for the
rights of marginalized communities. In Chambers’ eyes, the district plan is precisely that. In an
interview with National Geographic, Chambers responds to Republican lawmakers’, like
Hilkemann, efforts to abolish the system by stating: “You are not going to take away that one
little bit of impact that people in the district have on selecting the President”.145 Megan Hunt, a
state legislator from Omaha reiterates Chambers’ point saying that “When the conditions are
right, Nebraska becomes a state that candidates have to pay attention to”.146 While most of the
state does not necessarily experience the same intensity or attention that Omaha might in an
election year and necessarily think that it should, its efforts to change the plan might overlook
how the system creates a more equitable experience for voters that do not feel constrained to vote
along party lines. As the New York Times article discussed above points out, the system allows
for the same community to vote for Republicans in some elections and Democrats in others and
empowers them to choose the candidate over the politics.147

Recent Efforts for Reform
As recently as January of 2021, Wisconsin has proposed a bill to enact the district plan as
opposed to the winner-takes-all plan for allocating electoral votes. According to the Wisconsin
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Examiner, this bill is Republican sponsored, led by Representative Gary Tauchen, and is born
out of Donald Trump’s performance in the state where he lost its 10 electors to Joe Biden in the
2020 election. Under the district plan, Donald Trump would have walked away with six electoral
votes from the state, more than half. Tauchen believes the bill would better reflect Wisconsin’s,
“diverse political landscape”.148 Critics of the plan, see the bill not as progressive but as
dangerous. Barry Burden, founder of the Elections Research Center, warns that the plan is a
power-hungry partisan appeal by Republicans which would ultimately lead to disastrous
gerrymandering in a state whose districts are already drawn to a GOP advantage.149 Wisconsin,
while still in early stage of reform, acts as a particularly salient exemplar of both the widespread
concerns of gerrymandering and how clear partisan preferences can shoot an electoral plan in the
foot.

What to take away from Maine and Nebraska
Two states implemented the same electoral plan, the district system, for different reasons
and during distinct political environments. Maine ratified reform during the wake of a powerful
national reform era, where its own political leaders had been distinctively vocal in enacting
reform, and Nebraska ratified reform in an effort to make the state more visible and
consequential on the national stage. Analyzing the success of the district plan in aggregate by
whether it has “split” the state’s electoral votes demonstrates that the plan has had little effect
overall since for both states there have only two elections in which this has occurred. However, a
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microscopic look into the political experience of the citizens in these districts demonstrate higher
levels of political efficacy. These voters have an augmented sense that their vote may be
consequential in the election, whereas it would otherwise be overshadowed under a ‘winnertakes-all’ system. Lawmakers, such as those in Nebraska, have been fighting for these citizen’s
rights, especially because this plan has given more political power to minority voters. While this
may be the case for Maine and Nebraska, it is worth analyzing if this effect for minorities would
persist if this plan were to become a constitutional amendment and subsequently alter the impact
of every US Congressional District.
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Methodology
Research Problem & Methodological Approach
The research question that I address in this section is whether a national or state-level
shift to the district plan for allocating electoral votes would provide more benefits than the
current winner-takes-all system. In order to define “benefits” of an electoral system I will be
assessing the relative merits of the two system on seven separate criteria: Legitimacy,
Inclusiveness, Neutrality, Simplicity, Equality, Participation, and Feasibility. I was inspired to
utilize this methodological approach due to a similar variant of this method was utilized in Paul
D. Schumaker’s 2010 article, “The Good, the Better, the Best: Improving on the Acceptable
Electoral College” in which he compared the direct election method and instant runoff methods
to the current Electoral College system using nine criteria.150 I will differentiate myself from
Schumaker’s work by assessing these seven criteria quantitatively, whereas Schumacher relies
heavily on qualitative analysis.
I decided that this criterion-based method would be the most effective way to compare
the two electoral systems because “benefits” of an electoral system can be subjective. The
Electoral College, as is, has many benefits, yet it is still consistently under fire for being unfair,
antiquated, and unnecessary. Therefore, by imploring a broad analysis and evaluating these
systems with regards to several different key and valuable elements of the electoral process, I can
hopefully make a better informed, nuanced interpretation of the results and determine which
system might provide greater benefits. One of the key elements of my methodological approach
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when comparing and contrasting between the two systems, when appropriate within the criteria,
will be to assess the differences between swing places -- states in one system and districts in the
other. One of the major questions I faced when designing my analysis was how to define a
“swing place”. While there are many metrics to define a swing state—campaign events, expert
predictions, media interactions—those same metrics do not necessarily exist on the district level.
Therefore, in order to remain consistent between the two types of swing places, “swing” level
will be attributed to the margin of victory in that state or district after the election.

Data Collection
Comparing the district system to the current electoral system proves challenging because
there are less little data regarding how presidential elections operate on the district level than
state level. However, I was able to find district-level presidential election returns for the 2016
election. After contacting Penn Libraries, I was able to gain access to the Dave Leip’s Atlas for
U.S. Presidential Elections, where I was able to uncover presidential election returns data by
congressional district.151 This dataset will make up my interpretation of “swing district” by
specifically utilizing the margin of victory column. My contact at Penn Libraries, Lauris Olson,
advised me that the presidential election returns by district are difficult to acquire, and expensive,
and I should focus on 2016 election returns exclusively for this reason. Therefore, my analysis
will be centered around the 2016 election only when discussing the district level returns. As for
states, accessing information on margin of victory for the 2016 election and beyond is easily
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accessible. I utilized data I retrieved off of the Federal Election Commission’s website regarding
2016 election returns by state.152

Methodological Approach by Criteria
Each of the seven separate criteria for analysis required a different methodological
procedure. I will discuss these below by criteria.

Legitimacy
The literature review highlighted the discrepancy in the debate surrounding how to
determine electoral legitimacy. One method determines that legitimacy can be conferred based
on ease of recounts and elimination of the possibility for electoral fraud. Another method finds
any alteration to our current system as weakening electoral legitimacy. Additionally, a third
method envisions legitimacy in the Electoral College as consistency between the Electoral
College winner and the popular vote winner, because under these conditions the Electoral
College accurately reflects the “will of the people.” While uncommon, a discrepancy between
the national popular vote winner and the Electoral College winner occurred in 2016. In order to
accurately access which of the two electoral systems provide the most legitimate result I will
analyze the legitimacy as defined under the final method listed above: I will compare the actual
electoral votes from the winner-takes-all system, to the electoral votes under the hypothetical
district system for the 2016 election in order to discern if there still remains a discrepancy
between popular vote winner and electoral winner, or if a gap still persists but is significantly
diminished or increased with a shift in electoral system.
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Inclusiveness
Inclusiveness is defined as who is included in the electoral process, i.e., whose votes
matter and where do campaigns focus their energy as a result of where votes matter. While there
is no campaign data by congressional district, I approximated that campaigns would visit the
states which included one or more swing or close congressional district. I will compare the states
where either the Trump or Clinton campaigns held public events in 2016 to the states which hold
swing districts in 2016. I will utilize this metric to assess if “inclusiveness” increases or
decreases across the two systems. In order to analyze the campaign visits by state for the 2016
election, I will use Fair Vote’s General Election Events Tracker.153

Neutrality
The main methodological question behind neutrality is, does one electoral system
advantage a demographic group more than the other and would that bias shift from one electoral
system to another? The demographic factors of interest are median household income,
educational attainment, percent white, and unemployment rate. I will compare these factors by
margin of victory in both swing states and district to determine if one or more of these factors
can be predictive of swing places. If one of these factors are predictive of a low margin of
victory, I will gain insight into if these electoral systems benefit certain groups over others. I
retrieved demographic data from the census website for the 116th Congress.154
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Simplicity
Simplicity is defined as how easy it is for citizens to understand the electoral system. I
believe the best way to gauge knowledge and understanding of an electoral system is to utilize
public opinion data. In this part of the analysis, I will analysis the results of one survey
conducted by Pew Research Center in late October to early November of 2019, asking basic
knowledge questions regarding the current electoral system.155

Equality
Equality is defined as the equal distribution of voting power in the electoral process.
First, I will analyze voting power under the current system. I will conduct this analysis by
dividing the number of electoral votes by state by population in order to determine if residents
have the same level of voting power regardless of which state they live in. While I might not be
surprised to find that this is not the case, I will be looking more closely at the degree to which
this change between large and small states. Since electoral votes by state does not change with a
shift to the district plan, in order to detect any differences between the systems, I will analyze
how cumulative population between districts and states changes as margin increases. Through
this method, I will gain insight into whether close states or close districts will represent a include
a greater number of voters.

Participation
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For participation, Maine and Nebraska will act as prime examples and case studies for the
increase or decrease in voter turnout as a result of the district plan. Comparing these voter
turnout statistics overtime, before and after each state implemented the new plan, to the national
voter turnout statistics, will help control for elections which were better nationwide at mobilizing
voters for election-specific reasons (for example in 2008 and 2020).

Feasibility
Feasibility is defined as the ability for the district system to actually be implemented as
law, through a constitutional amendment or on the state level. A case study review of Maine and
Nebraska’s reasons for implementing the district system, as seen in the previous section, does not
provide clear evidence for optimal conditions for ratifying the plan. However, bipartisan support
was critical for both states in passing legislation, and therefore is a key metric for gaining some
insight into whether states could be successful at changing their electoral system. This section
will discuss bipartisan efforts in key states according to the 2016 presidential returns by
congressional district.
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Results
Legitimacy
The 2016 election brought challenges and questions of electoral legitimacy to centerstage; it was one of four elections in American history in which the winner of the Electoral
College did not win the popular vote. Many critics of the Electoral College call on the
discrepancy between the Electoral College winner and the popular vote winner to be one of the
strongest justifications for reform because it delegitimizes the results of the Electoral College. At
the same time, proponents of the Electoral College celebrate the current winner-takes-all system
because of how efficiently it translates popular vote margins into electoral wins. Legitimacy and
how to define it lies at the crux of the debate. In my analysis, I detect if there was any difference
in electoral winner under a hypothetical 2016 district system, wherein the winner of the popular
vote, Hillary Clinton, would have also won a majority of Electoral College votes. Below, the
graph illustrates Electoral College votes by candidate for the two electoral system.
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The data demonstrate if the district plan had been adopted in 2016, in fact, Donald Trump
would have still won the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote. In one view of
“legitimacy” this result determines no consequential difference between the two systems. A
deeper dive into the results, however, shows that the electoral discrepancy between popular vote
winner and Electoral College winner is smaller under the district system. Donald Trump would
have still surpassed 270 electoral votes, but he would have not reached 300 votes or higher. In
fact, his resounding electoral win under the current system is diminished under the district
system, in which he loses 16 votes. The following graph depicts electoral vote shares across the
two systems compared to popular vote shares, providing a deeper insight into how effectively the
two systems translate vote margins.

Here, a visual depiction of how the 2016 popular vote compared to the electoral vote
shares across the two systems demonstrates a closer estimate of translating popular vote margins
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into electoral wins, raising questions of whether the winner-takes-all system should be revered
for how it reflects popular vote margins. The margin of victory in the Electoral College under the
current system is 13%, whereas under the district system it is only 8%. Therefore, a margin of
victory of 8% is a closer representation of the popular vote.
The district system does not provide resounding differences in legitimacy as compared to
winner-takes-all. This is relevant because in 2016, most of the complaints surrounded who won
the election not the margin of victory. In essence, the confusion and uncertainty of this unusual
election—with a discrepancy between popular vote winner and Electoral College winner—would
persist under the alternative district plan. However, analyzing the margins of victory of the two
plans side by side reveals the Electoral College under winner-takes-all is non-ideal for translating
popular vote margins. Therefore, under the district system there is more legitimacy to the
electoral winner, even if it cannot appropriately correct for popular vote losses. Bearing in mind,
however this difference is minute, leaving the potential for it to be lost on voters, rendering its
insignificance.

Inclusiveness
With electoral reform comes massive structural changes to how campaigns are managed.
Critics of the Electoral College are angered that many states are ignored by campaigns, which
illuminates larger structural issues with the system; it creates a crisis of inclusion in our
democratic process, where campaigns prioritize the needs of select voters. In fact, the desire for
campaign attention was the driving force behind why Nebraska decided to shift to the district
system in 1991.156 The below graphs, which shows campaign events per campaign by state, and
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are taken from FairVote, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization whose mission is to advocate for
electoral solutions. 157 FairVote carefully tallied 2016 election campaign events by state. The data
in the graphs only include events that were open to the public or whose primary purpose was to
influence local voters in the area in which the event occurred. Examples of these events were
rallies, speeches, fairs and town-hall meetings.158

The data is clear: The Trump campaign prioritized a narrow group of states across the
country. During his 2016 campaign, only 12 states received more than 1 campaign visit by
Donald Trump, with 3 states—Florida, North Carolina, and Ohio—receiving a largely unequal
distribution of over 30 events. Based on FairVote’s calculation, over the course of the election

“94% of 2016 Presidential Campaign Was in Just 12 Closely Divided States,” National Popular Vote, August 16,
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season, Donald Trump held approximately 248 public campaign events in which 88.31% of them
were held in the “swing states” listed above. Hillary Clinton, according to FairVote’s
calculations throughout the election cycle, had fewer campaign events than Donald Trump,
spanning an even smaller portion of states, illustrated below.

The Clinton campaign held public events in nearly the same twelve states as the Trump
campaign. Both campaigns included Florida and North Carolina in their top three priority states
on the trail. Bearing in mind, even though these events are only a piece of the interactions
between campaigns and voters by state, the incidence of these events still reveal a harrowing
depiction of inclusiveness. Only a few states are prioritized, with an even smaller few getting a
disproportionate amount of attention. It is challenging to know how campaigns would adapt to an
entirely new electoral system. Even more, how campaigning in certain places which are deemed
swing districts over other districts might have a positive reinforcing effect, making them more
competitive and susceptible to campaign attention over time. However, an analysis of swing
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districts in the 2016 election—which was determined by isolating the districts which saw a
margin of victory under 10%—illustrates a very different picture of what campaigning might
look like under this new electoral system. The below graph explicates the number of swing
districts in each state based on 2016 presidential election returns.

As opposed to the limited twelves states which the Trump and Clinton campaigns visited
in 2016, under the district system the electoral map expands. Now, over half of the state, 26,
have either one or more swing districts, which could warrant the state a campaign visit at some
point during the election process. How to assume campaigns would respond under a hypothetical
system without any concrete historical evidence is challenging, however if there is a larger
spread of places with tighter partisan margins, then campaigns will need to fight for their
attention. Since congressional districts are small compared to states, neighboring districts, even
those which are not marginal, might feel energized by campaign events happening in nearby
districts, creating a spillover effect.
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States which have high numbers of swing districts under this hypothetical system are the
largest states with many districts clustered in one area. Campaigns, therefore, might
disproportionately visit larger states. As depicted in the graphic above which shows California’s
districts by margin, California could potentially be one of the most visited states by campaigns
because of its sheer number of congressional districts, 53. Under the winner-takes-all system,
California is reliably blue. However, under the district system, with the potential for more
attention from campaigns, California might increase in competitiveness. Other prominent states
on the map under the district plan are the other large states with several districts, such as New
Jersey, New York, and Texas. These states are historically neglected by campaigns, but the data
reveals that this has the possibility to change.
Despite newfound large-state prevalence, the twelve swing states such as Florida,
Pennsylvania, Ohio identified above are still relevant swing places in the district system.
However, they might be forced to “share the campaign spotlight” under a district-dominant
electoral map. Electoral College conservatives find reform to switch to direct election system
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unacceptable because of the dominance of large states such as Texas, California, and New York
on the electoral map—the very thing the Electoral College has tried to prevent by giving small
states power with the additional two senatorial electoral votes per state. Yet, while larger states
might receive more attention by campaigns under this new system, small states still retain the
same level of power as before since the number of electoral votes by state has not changed.
While swing states prove to have powerful influence on who is prioritized during the
election, those same places are unfairly advantaged while presidents are in office as well.
According to Brendan J. Doherty’s research on state-level visits by presidents while they are in
office, presidential attention and neglect are related to the geographic patterns which are
governed by the Electoral College.159 Therefore, electoral reform that expands campaign
inclusiveness not only improves the democratic process but also holds drastic policy and
governance implications as well. For example, Donald Trump took noticeable inaction against
California wildfires while in office, and while that may have been a result of his fervent denial of
climate change and its effects, California’s irrelevance to his electoral gains in the 2020 election
may have further augmented his refusal to provide appropriate federal aid and attention to the
crisis.160 Overall, the district plan is more inclusive from a campaigning perspective than the
current winner-takes-all system which could have significant electoral and policy consequences.
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Neutrality
Not only is a non-biased, neutral system the most likely to pass congressional approval
and garner an amendment, but it is also the most just. In this section, I will analyze the neutrality
concerns for the district system as compared to winner-takes-all by detecting any demographic
biases. Swing places—either districts or states—hold the power in a presidential election.
Analyzing demographic factors such as income, education level, percent white, and
unemployment levels in these key areas can give a sense of which demographic groups hold
power in this electoral process. A comparison between systems, therefore, can show if there is a
shift in demographic bias or not when adopting the district plan.

Figure 1 Predicting Swing States by Demographic Factors
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The above decision tree depicts which demographic factors influence swing states under
the winner-takes-all system. The decision tree demonstrates that demographic factors are not a
strong predictor of whether a state is swing or not. The leaf node which gives the lowest value
for margin, 9.502% is predicted only by the demographic variable of median household income.
This result shows that states with a median household income somewhere between $51,918/year
and $58,848/year are predictive of a small margin of victory, or a swing place. Even so, a margin
of 9.502% is not the closest or most “swing-like’ margin, which proves further evidence that
demographic factors are weak predictors. Therefore, for swing states, there are other important
predictor characteristics that are not demographic in nature which predict their small margin of
victory, or swing-like quality.
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The above eight regression plots demonstrate the correlations of these four demographic
factors on margin of victory within these states and districts across the two systems. For all four
of the characteristics across both states and districts the correlations are both weak and nonlinear. Additionally, in both systems we see a lot of noise around the lowess smoothing lines. As
with the decision tree above, these plots demonstrate further that demographic variables alone
are poor predictors of margin both in states and in districts. However, on average, middle ground
demographic characteristics—middle income, percent white, educational attainment, and
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unemployment rate—are the best predictors of these swing places between both systems. Despite
these correlations being weak, they are consistent across all demographic characteristics which
strengthens this argument further. In addition, while the lowess line is smooth for the district
plots, the line appears to be jagged for the state plots. The jaggedness of this lowess line is due to
the smaller number of data points (only 50 states versus 435 districts) used in these regression
plot. Despite the smaller sample size, however, the trend is still intact, and this is not necessarily
a display of randomness.
While the two sets of regression plots have similar demographic features, the plots which
represent the district system appear to have a bias towards white residents. As seen in the
Percent White on Margin by District graph, all the districts which have a percent white score of
.5 or lower have a considerably high margin of victory, indicating low levels of “swing districtness”. Alternatively, those districts which have low margins of victory are saturated with white
voters. In fact, an overwhelming majority of “swing districts” have high levels of percent white
residents. Therefore, while the two systems display strikingly similar demographic populations,
the district system presents a considerable bias towards white voters. This bias is notable because
it contributes to the disenfranchisement of minority voters in our political process.
Overall, the data demonstrating that demographics are considerably weak predictors of
swing places in either system is not shocking, even while the district system presents a white
bias. These demographic factors—income, educational attainment, race, and unemployment
levels—are largely strong predictors of partisanship at the extremes. Therefore, in the places
which are average in nearly all of these characteristics, we would expect to see the highest levels
of competitiveness. Those Americans in the middle continue to hold the greatest power, district
or otherwise. Ultimately, however, the slight demographic shift which empowers white voters
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under the district systems causes for both alarm and caution if it were to be formally
implemented nationwide. Since the district system favors white voters, its implementation would
be detrimental to incorporate into an electoral system where minorities already experience
widescale voter suppression and considerably diminished political power.

Simplicity
As stated early in this thesis in the literature review, the ability to understand our
country’s electoral system is essential to citizens’ willingness to participate in it. Greater internal
political efficacy or the self-perception that an individual is capable of understanding politics—
provides more citizens with the competence and thus the confidence to participate in political
acts such as (and most importantly to an electoral system) voting.161 Many Americans are
confused by our antiquated, unnecessary, and clunky electoral system. Below, the graph
discusses the results from a recent public opinion survey, conducted in 2019, by Pew Research
Center. The survey asked the question amongst a sample of adults nationwide:
As you may know, presidents are chosen not by direct popular vote, but by the Electoral
College in which each state casts electoral votes. What determines the number of
electoral votes a state has?... The number of voters in the state, the number of seats the
state has in the United States House and Senate (Correct), the number of counties in the
state, each state has the same number of electoral votes”.162
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As seen in the figure, while the plurality of survey respondents states the correct answer,
at 39%, a significant number said the wrong answer, the number of voters in the state, at 28%
and an almost equivalent amount responded with, Not Sure at 26%. Therefore, when aggregating
these numbers, a total of 54% of Americans surveyed either have incorrect knowledge about the
Electoral College or are simply unsure about the answer. While this survey question fields only
one specific area of the knowledge surrounding the Electoral College, and arguably it is a
specific fact regarding the Electoral College that is not entirely essential to participating in it, it is
certainly emblematic of a widespread problem that Americans are uninformed with how our
system works and why it is the way it is. Understandably, the Electoral College is confusing, and
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therefore, in implementing the district plan, we should not expect an increase in the level of ease
with understanding the Electoral College, rather it would make the whole system even more
complex. Therefore, while the Electoral College is complex, confusing, and widely
misunderstood by many Americans, the district system would be even more complex, confusing,
and require Americans to adapt to a whole new system while they may have never even fully
adapted to the original system in the first place.

Equality
Small states are powerful in this electoral system. Due to the additional two senatorial
electoral votes that each state is granted in the Electoral College, the states with the smallest
populations have substantial if not disproportionate power when it comes to presidential
elections. Dividing up the electoral votes per each state by the population could be an effective
measure for determining voter power per person by state. For example, below are two graphs,
one which represents population by state. The other graph depicts voting power by state, in
which I divided the number of electoral votes by the population in each state. While voters rarely
think of their individual voting power when deciding when to vote, and everyone’s voting power
is astronomically tiny in the grand scheme and therefore cannot be a true evaluation of power on
the individual level, comparing how voting power varies on aggregate by state underscores just
how differently votes matter across the country.
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As seen above, California, Florida, New York, and Texas have enormous populations
which overpower the rest of the country. However, on an electoral level, voters in those states
hold very little voting power as depicted in the second graph. Whereas, Wyoming, Vermont,
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Arkansas, and North Dakota, states which have well under a million residents, dominate in terms
of electoral voting power. The Electoral College is inherently unequal between states and
between individuals across the nation

While both the district system and the current winner-takes-all method use the
Electoral College in the same way, in the sense that they allocate the same number of electoral
votes to the same states, voting power per individual does not differ state to state. However, we
can analyze voting power instead of sheer voting power per person, as whether there is an
increase of the number of people who live in swing places between the two systems because the
residents of swing districts often get the most attention from campaigns, politicians while in
office, and get out the vote measures. Therefore, it is important to note whether swing districts

72

and swing states would incorporate a greater swath of the population, thereby giving greater
voting power to more individuals around the country. Ultimately, as seen in the graph above, this
is not the case. Even though there may be more individual swing districts, this effect is
diminished when accounting for population.
A smaller number of states gives more people greater voting power than a large
number of districts. For example, as we can see in the graph, for a margin of victory in the 2016
election of approximately 10% or lower, nearly 100 million people are represented in those areas
in the winner takes all method, but only 50 million people are represented under the district plan.
I think this is a surprising finding because we might expect that a larger number of competitive
districts across the country would result in a greater reach, however this is not the case. This
section demonstrates that the Electoral College is wildly unequal, and that inequality would not
change with a shift to district from the winner-takes-all system. Furthermore, even fewer people
would be in the most competitive areas across the country, demonstrating one powerful way in
which the current system is better than a proposed electoral shift to congressional districts.
Of course, the data represented in the graph, Margin in 2016 Election by
Population, States vs. Districts, only utilizes marginal returns from one of the elections so it is
difficult to confidently say if this result perfectly maps onto other elections and can be
generalized. However, this one election certainly gives some semblance of an idea of how swing
places behave and who they are comprised of—whether it is states or districts.

Participation
We crave an electoral system which will maximize voter turnout. On one hand, high
voter turnout rates could indicate a healthy and well-functioning democracy. On the other hand,
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high voter turnout rates could indicate frustration and a need for change on the part of the
national government, especially during presidential election years. Whichever way voter turnout
is interpreted as a reflection of our democracy, it is more important to this analysis, however, to
determine the electoral method which maximizes voter turnout. Below is a graph of national
voter turnout rates from 1964 to 2020.

National voter turnout rates are relatively stable over time, existing between slightly
under 55% and never passing 70%. There are some significant elections, which saw spikes in
turnout, for example the 2008 and 2020 elections. In 2008, voter turnout was the highest since
the late 1960s as seen in the graph, which many attribute to the fact that 2008 was a historic
election with Barack Obama’s candidacy.163 Furthermore, it was no doubt that the 2020 election
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was historic as well, which saw record voter turnout. In 2020, instead of high voter turnout
reflecting a well-functioning democracy, many people swarmed the polls mostly due to deep
frustration and anger with the current political system. Maintaining high voter turnout over time
is a goal of electoral reformers, regardless of isolated, historic events which have prompted
short-term bursts in participation.
In order to understand if a transition to the district system would have any effect on voter
turnout and participation, I would need to analyze how voter participation rates have changed in
the two states which have actually implemented these systems: Maine and Nebraska.
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Above is a graph of the national voter turnout rate subtracted from the Nebraska voter
turnout rates from 1980 to 2020, therefore showing Nebraska’s voter turnout rates compared to
the national averages. One of the important things to note about the graph is that there are no
values below 0, which indicates that turnout in Nebraska is consistently higher than the national
average. However, Nebraska had relatively high voter turnout compared with the national
averages before the significant date of 1992—the year when the state implemented the district
plan. Overall, Nebraska has high voter turnout nationally, but it does not seem that the different
electoral plan has had significant impacts on increasing voter turnout beyond its pre-district plan
numbers.

Maine, on the other hand, tells a very different story. Voter turnout in Maine is
consistently high. In many election years, Maine demonstrates a voter turnout rate well above the
national average, most years 10 percentage points above the national average. Voter turnout rates
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in Maine saw a substantial increase in the several decades which followed the implementation of
the district plan which was in 1968. While these results cannot say anything casual about the
district plan and how it has directly impacted voter turnout in these states, we can use voter
turnout rates and district plan implementation to understand any correlational effects at play.
Both states demonstrate higher than average voter turnout rates. However, each state tells a
different story about how voter turnout has changed after the implementation of the plan. For
example, in Maine voter turnout skyrocketed, and in Nebraska it tapered off.
Ultimately, it is difficult to discern if a third variable is a play here, and maybe there is a
cultural difference which both states have, which not only drives their voter turnout rates to be
higher than the national averages, but also motivated their citizens and policymakers to make a
distinct political change by altering their electoral systems. Overall, however, it is undeniable
that these two distinct states with the district plan have increased participation compared to other
states across the country and that should not go unnoticed when evaluating the effect that the
district plan can have on an individual’s political experience and motivation to participate.

Feasibility
Electoral reform is extremely difficult to pass on the national level because of the
necessity of a constitutional amendment. Nearly 700 reform proposals have been brought to
congress over the past 200 years demanding reform in our electoral process, yet very few actual
changes have been enacted as a result.164 What will it take, then, to see any sort of changes over
the next several decades if the past has proven to be dismal regarding the prospects of electoral
change? I have focused on the district plan precisely because I believe of all the electoral plans it
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is the one which is most ripe for implementation. Not only have two states already implemented
the plan, which proves promising because its already actually happened, it is the plan which
closely aligns with the structures of the Electoral College already in place—therefore it is not
asking for anything as revolutionary as perhaps, a direct election method might ask for.
The district plan maintains the same number of electoral votes as the winner-takes-all
method which indicates that small states might be open to the plan because they are not giving
up their disproportionate power. Therefore, small states might be more willing to give the plan
consideration when proposed to congress, whereas that would be unlikely with a direct election
proposal. Therefore, maintaining federalism is an important feature of the Electoral College that
many congressmen are dedicated to maintaining in any electoral proposal. Therefore, a plan,
such as the district plan, which maintains federalism, is not entirely destined for failure.
When analyzing the two states which have been successful at implementing the plan,
there is little that they have in common. Therefore, the factors which contribute directly to
success are unclear. Maine, for example, implemented the plan because the state’s legislators
were deeply involved in national electoral reform after a tumultuous national election which
sparked skepticism regarding the Electoral College. Nebraska, on the other hand, implemented
the plan for a very different reason. Nebraska, not at all a swing state, in fact a consistently and
overwhelmingly red state, felt that the district plan might encourage more campaign attention
and candidate foot-traffic to the state. However, the one thing which the states did have in
common is that they had bipartisan support behind the plan. Therefore, bipartisan support is most
likely the greatest indicator of success for implementing the district plan, or any electoral plan
for that matter, on the state level.
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The above map visually illustrates the 2016 election returns by congressional district,
specifically demonstrating the places which saw the closest margins. This map gives clarity as to
which states might be most likely to successfully implement a change in how their electoral
votes are allocated. States which have both red and blue districts with close margins,
demonstrating gains for partisans on both sides of the aisle, for example, Nevada, Oregon, or
New Mexico, might be ripe for this monumental political change. Furthermore, large states such
as New York, New Jersey, California may find the plan a worthwhile investment because it
would draw attention from candidates to their states in a system where they are consistently seen
as not “worth it” because they are consistently blue. On the other hand, however, these blue
giants, which are ultimately controlled primarily by democrats, might not want to provide any
opportunities for the states to split electoral votes, giving any additional electoral votes to
Republicans, even if that might increase campaign attention. Therefore, large blue states such as
these could be of the least likely of all of the states to implement the district plan.
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Ultimately, it is impossible to predict which places might implement electoral reform
since so few places have effectively and successfully called for reform. However, we can begin
to address the question of how feasible reform is by analyzing the bipartisan nature of certain
places because as we have learned from Nebraska and Maine, that is the key element for
electoral reform success.

Conclusion of Results
To summarize, the following table illustrates the findings of this results section,
comparing the current electoral system under winner-takes-all to the proposed district plan. The
shaded areas represent the plan which “wins out” when comparing the two plans. If there is no
clear plan which is better, the Electoral College winner-takes-all method would dominate
because it is the current system in place and therefore is preferable because it would not require
reform.

Criterion

Electoral College:
Winner-Takes-All Method

Electoral College:
The District Plan

Legitimacy

Celebrated for translating popular
vote margins well; can produce
illegitimate elections where there is
a discrepancy between Electoral
College and popular vote winner
(rare)

Better translation of popular vote
margins into electoral votes; can also
produce illegitimate elections which has
a discrepancy between Electoral College
and popular vote winner (rare)

Inclusiveness

Limited number of states which are
deemed worthwhile to campaign in,
creating an exclusive electoral map

Many more states which would include a
“swing district”, has the potential to
expand campaigning and have spillover
effects
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Neutrality

Weak demographic bias, middle of
the road places greatest indicator of
swing states

Weak but WHITE demographic bias,
middle of the road places greatest
indicator of swing districts

Simplicity

Complex to understand, might
discourage political efficacy

Would necessarily be even more
complex to understand with additional
caveats to the current Electoral College
system

Equality

Despite smaller states residents
having disproportionate voting
power in Electoral College; swing
states encompass many more voters
than swing districts

Small states continue to hold
disproportionate voting power and far
fewer people represented in swing
districts than in swing states

Participation

Discourages participation in many
states which residents do not feel as
if their vote can make a difference

Nebraska and Maine have consistently
higher turnout rates; Maine sees a spike
in turnout rates after implementation of
the plan, Nebraska does not.

No change required

Would require amendment or state
ratification, but possible—two states
have done it! Bipartisan support in states
is the key

Feasibility

While these categories are not entirely black and white, and it is not easy to discern a
perfect “winner”, analyzing these results on several metrics can give insight into which option
might be more worthwhile for the country. Despite, the close tie between the two plans as
explicated by my results and in the table above, it is still unclear if going through the hurdles of
implementing an entirely new electoral plan nationwide are worth the benefits of the plan. This
debate will be further scrutinized in the conclusion section of this thesis.

81

Conclusion
My results do not provide resounding evidence in favor of electoral reform. There are
criteria in which the district plan provides more benefits than the current winner-takes-all system,
however they are neither numerous nor profound. For example, the district plan might help to
better legitimatize elections than the current system because it better translates popular vote
margins into electoral wins. However, this benefit is only marginal since the district plan would
not have changed the mismatch between the popular vote winner and the Electoral College
winner in the 2016 election. Furthermore, the district plan might expand the states in which
campaigns prioritize leading up to the election because there are smaller swing areas in many
states across the country instead of a handful of swing states. However, this effect can be
overshadowed by the fact that the winner-takes-all method, while prioritizing a smaller number
of swing states, still includes a larger number of voters nationwide than the district plan would.
The voter participation rates in Maine and Nebraska are higher than the national average
which could be attributed to the district plan, in which residents in these key districts might feel
that their votes matter more than other places in the country driving them to vote. However, I
wonder if this plan were to be extended to the rest of the nation, if the “uniqueness” felt by these
voters would persist nationally and the district plan would have an increased effect on voter
turnout. Alternatively, there could be a third variable at play with Maine and Nebraska, wherein
the same motivation behind voting is the same political motivation which encouraged both states
to adopt a unique electoral plan. Not to mention, the district plan has a bias towards white voters
which is concerning. This evident bias could be the nail-in-the-coffin finding to justify not
implementing the plan nationwide. Clearly, adopting the district plan is feasible because it has
been done before. However, it certainly would not be easy. Especially on the national level, as
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history has clearly shown, passing an electoral reform amendment is nearly impossible.
Therefore, as my results have shown, the benefits of a new electoral plan are few and far
between. I am led to ask myself if it would be worth it at all.
Ultimately, my research has left me with a newfound appreciation for the Electoral
College; this is shocking to me due to the fact that I despised our current electoral system at the
beginning of my research journey. At first glance, the Electoral College is seemingly corrupt,
unfair, and antiquated, but I have developed a deeper understanding for the tradeoffs which have
to exist to make an electoral system function. After careful analysis, the only solution which
exists for the Electoral College is either to keep it and embrace it or to abolish it all together and
adopt direct election. To me, no Electoral College replacement—district plan or otherwise—is
particularly worth the national strife we would need to undertake to get there. Direct election, of
course, comes with its own consequences. Aside from passing an amendment which would be
extraordinarily arduous, election fraud would be significantly difficult to address and contain.
Before November 2020, I would not have considered this to be a significant strike against the
direct election plan, however with the increase in election fraud claims by the president and other
high-ranking officials under a historically trusted and respected system, in addition to a violent
insurrection on our capitol as a result of these bogus claims, increasing the chances for fraud is a
risk we cannot take.
The United States needs a powerful force to motivate a complete overhaul of our current
electoral process. Unfortunately, the political climate of today does not prove to be ripe for the
circumstances of grand, structural electoral change. Hopefully, one day, we will be able to live in
an America which can withstand the growing pains of revolutionary electoral reform, so that we
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can build a better, brighter, and more equitable elections process where every American can feel
valued.
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